Abstract Abstract Asquith, Oman, and Safaya (2010) conclude that short sales are often misclassified by the Lee-Ready algorithm. The algorithm identifies most short sales as buyer-initiated, whereas the authors posit that short sales should be overwhelmingly seller-initiated. Using order data to identify true trade initiator, we document that short sales are, in fact, predominantly buyer-initiated and that the Lee-Ready algorithm correctly classifies most of them. Misclassification rates for short and long sales are near zero at the daily level. At the trade level, misclassification rates are 31% using contemporaneous quotes and trades and decline to 21% when quotes are lagged one second.
Introduction
Research in securities markets relies on trade direction to arrive at inferences on a wide array of subjects, from transaction costs and trading behavior of various investor groups to market efficiency and optimal market structure. Because trading data from many sources, including the NYSE's Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, lack trade direction identifiers, it is impossible to directly determine from these data whether a trade was initiated by a buyer or by a seller. Thus the literature has developed methods that allow for indirect trade classification, commonly referred to as "trade classification algorithms." The ability of such algorithms to correctly identify the trade initiator directly affects the credibility of a large body of empirical research.
The most commonly used trade classification algorithm is that proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) . 1 The Lee-Ready algorithm infers trade direction from the trade price position relative to the prevailing quotes and historical prices. Studies using data from the early 1990s find that the Lee-Ready algorithm correctly classifies about 85% of all trades (e.g., Finucane, 2000; OddersWhite, 2000) , but in recent years questions have arisen about the efficacy of the Lee-Ready algorithm given the significant changes in market structure since the early 1990s.
Most recently, Asquith, Oman, and Safaya (2010) argue conceptually that short sales should be predominantly seller-initiated, yet they find that the Lee-Ready algorithm more often classifies short sales as buyer-initiated. The authors conclude that the algorithm is unreliable when used to classify short sales. Such a conclusion casts a shadow over many recent studies of short selling that use the Lee-Ready algorithm to sign trades. These studies find that short sellers provide liquidity when it is needed, help keep prices in check, and contribute to price discovery and market efficiency (e.g., Alexander and Peterson, 2008; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009b; Bailey and Zheng, 2010; Boehmer and Wu, 2010; and Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putniņš, 2011) . These findings are important from a policymaking standpoint, particularly in light of the negative public image of short sellers and recent debates over bringing back short-sale restrictions. 2 Furthermore, even studies that do not focus on short selling would be compromised if short sales were systematically misclassified by the Lee-Ready algorithm, as short sales represent a significant portion of general trading activity (e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009a, report that short selling accounts for over 24% of the volume in NYSE stocks and for over 36% of the volume in NASDAQ stocks). Given the importance of understanding short and long sellers' actions for academic research and policymaking, it is imperative to assess the Lee-Ready algorithm's reliability in classifying trades.
In this paper, we use INET 3 order data to examine whether the Lee-Ready algorithm correctly identifies the true trade initiator for short sales. We also examine the Lee-Ready algorithm's accuracy for long sales to see if the performance differs for short versus long sales.
The INET order data allow us to match each trade to the orders that constitute it and determine whether the trade is triggered by a sell order or a buy order, without relying on the Lee-Ready (or any other) algorithm. We follow the convention in the market microstructure literature of considering a trade to be "initiated" by the last party to agree to the trade, the party whose decision causes the trade to occur. The initiator is thus the liquidity demander in the trade. For each INET trade, we identify the true trade initiator from the order data and then compare these true initiation statistics with the Lee-Ready estimates.
Our study addresses three issues. First, we ask whether Lee-Ready correctly classifies short sales at the daily level, to shed light on Asquith et al.'s (2010) argument regarding short sales.
We also analyze long sales to provide a basis for comparing whether Lee-Ready performs relatively worse for short than long sales and address more general concerns about using LeeReady to sign trades. Second, we examine the accuracy of the Lee-Ready algorithm at the trade level, comparing the results from our 2005 sample to the trade-level results from the early 1990s (as in Odders-White, 2000) . As part of our trade-level analysis, we re-examine the current practice of using contemporaneous quotes to sign trades versus Lee and Ready's (1991) recommendation that quotes should be lagged. Third, we examine the consequences of trade misclassification at the daily and intraday level in the context of studying the aggressiveness of short and long sellers. We ask whether inferences about short-and long-seller aggressiveness based on the true trade initiator are different from those obtained using the Lee-Ready algorithm.
Addressing the first issue, we find that short sales are more often buyer-initiated than sellerinitiated, whereas long sales are more often seller-initiated than buyer-initiated. About 43% of short sales are truly seller-initiated in our sample, whereas close to 54% of long sales are truly seller-initiated. In other words, in short sales it is the buyer of securities who usually causes the trade to occur by taking the liquidity provided by a short seller. In contrast, long sellers consume liquidity more often than they provide it. These findings are important on two levels. First, the Lee-Ready algorithm appears to be correct in classifying most short sales as buyer-initiated, in contrast to Asquith et al.'s (2010) conjectures. Second, at the daily level, Lee-Ready classifications match true trade classifications almost perfectly. The differences between true and inferred classifications are insignificant statistically and economically. These results provide support for studies such as Diether et al. (2009b) and Bailey and Zheng (2010) that use daily data to draw inferences.
That the Lee-Ready algorithm performs well at the daily level does not guarantee that it is equally accurate at the trade level, since daily aggregation could obscure offsetting trade misclassifications. To address our second question, we compare the trade initiator estimates of Lee-Ready to the true trade initiator from the order data. Using contemporaneous quotes and trades, Lee-Ready misclassifies up to 32% of all short sales and up to 31% of all long sales.
Because misclassification rates are similar for buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades, they cancel each other out at the daily level, resulting in the high daily success rates reported earlier.
Although our results are not directly comparable to those in Odders-White (2000), we note that misclassifications appear to have increased from the early 1990s, when Odders-White finds that about 15% of all trades are misclassified.
We next examine whether the increase in misclassifications is explained by temporal changes in trade or stock characteristics that the earlier literature finds are related to the error rates of the Lee-Ready algorithm. We confirm that trade size, trade price relative to the NBBO, stock trading frequency, and firm size are still important determinants of misclassification rates in our sample, yet none of these characteristics changes enough to explain the overall increase in misclassification rates since the 1990s. We further show that a relatively simple adjustment to the algorithm reduces misclassification rates by about one third: Using a one-second quote lag lowers the incidence of misclassification from 32% to 21% for short sales and from 31% to 22% for long sales. This finding suggests that researchers should consider returning to the practice of lagging quotes in intraday studies. Notably, lagging quotes does not improve Lee-Ready accuracy in the daily aggregates.
Finally, we examine the consequences of trade misclassification for the inferences drawn from studying short sale and long sale aggressiveness in a multivariate framework. Diether et al. (2009b) find that the variation in short selling as a percentage of total volume suggests that short sellers are contrarian, risk-bearing liquidity providers. Extending their argument to trade aggressiveness (the percentage of trades that are seller-initiated), we confirm that short sellers indeed often act as liquidity providers, as do long sellers. Short sellers and long sellers are less aggressive (provide more liquidity) on days when returns and buy-sell order imbalances are positive. On days when returns are negative, short and long sellers demand liquidity. Notably, liquidity supply and demand patterns by short and long sellers are statistically indistinguishable, which is surprising given short sellers' negative reputation. On the intraday level, we find that short sellers (but not long sellers) provide more liquidity when spreads are wider. Using LeeReady estimates generally leads to inferences that are similar to those obtained using true trade direction, although some coefficient estimates differ economically. Overall, our findings support the use of the Lee-Ready algorithm in daily studies; however, studies using the Lee-Ready algorithm at the intraday level should be aware of the increase in trade misclassifications since the early 1990s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and sample.
Section 3 presents our results on the performance of the Lee-Ready estimates compared to the true data for short sales and long sales in a univariate setting. Section 4 compares the performance of the Lee-Ready estimates to the true data in a multivariate analysis of trade aggressiveness. Section 5 concludes.
Data and sample selection
Our analysis uses data from TAQ, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the short sales data provided by exchanges under the SEC's Reg SHO initiative, and order data from INET. We analyze data from two months (June and December 2005) to replicate the sample period in Asquith et al. (2010). 4 In 2005, under Reg SHO, one third of the stocks in the Russell 3000 index are designated as pilot stocks, for which short sale price tests are suspended. The remaining -non-pilot -stocks are subject to an uptick rule on the NYSE and a bid price test on NASDAQ. 
Sample construction
We construct our sample of pilot stocks as follows. From CRSP, we collect all NASDAQlisted common stocks (SHRCD = 10 and 11, EXCH = 3) that trade every day during May, June, and December 2005. We exclude NASDAQ small-cap stocks (NMSID = 3) and stocks with prices below $5 per share. We then use the Reg SHO list to separate the stocks into a pilot sample (342 stocks) and a non-pilot sample (1,319 stocks). To form a size-stratified sample of pilot stocks, we rank the pilot stocks by market capitalization as of the end of May 2005 and select every third stock, for a total of 100 stocks.
We construct a matched sample of 100 non-pilot stocks as follows. Using one-to-one matching without replacement, we determine a unique non-pilot match for each stock in our pilot sample based on CRSP market capitalization, closing price, and share volume. We use market capitalization and price at the end of May 2005 and average daily trading volume in May 2005, which precedes our analysis period. We randomize the order of matching by sorting the pilot stocks alphabetically by ticker symbol. We then calculate the following matching error for each pilot stock i and each remaining non-pilot stock j:
where MCAP is the stock's market capitalization, PRC is the stock's closing price, and VOL is the stock's average daily volume. For each pilot stock, we select the non-pilot stock with the lowest matching error and subsequently remove the selected non-pilot stock from the list of potential non-pilot matches for the remaining pilot stocks. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the pilot stocks and the matched sample of non-pilot stocks.
[ Table 1 Here] Table 1 shows that the pilot and non-pilot samples are well-matched on market capitalization, price, and volume, with mean and median differences insignificantly different from zero. The pilot and non-pilot samples also exhibit similar volume-based characteristics (i.e., number of trades, number of short sales, number of shorted shares, and proportion of short volume in total volume). We note that a few of the spread differences are statistically significant, yet they are economically small and the differences switch signs among the four measures. For example, the mean percentage quoted spread is higher for pilot stocks, but the median percentage quoted spread is lower. Overall, there are no consistent differences between the two samples.
We note that our sample of stocks differs from that of Asquith et al. (2010 Asquith et al. (2010) . These two months also offer the advantage of capturing a recent, relatively "normal" time in the markets -after decimalization, but before the financial crisis and the scrutiny of short sellers that followed (e.g., Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2009; Beber and Pagano, 2011) . [ Figure 1 Here]
Determination of trade initiator for INET trades
The heart of this paper is a comparison of the true percentage of short and long sales that are seller-initiated, as determined from the INET order data, and the percentage of short and long sales estimated to be seller-initiated by the Lee-Ready algorithm. In this section, we first examine how much of the trading in NASDAQ stocks occurs on INET and then discuss the identification of trade initiator using order data and the Lee-Ready algorithm.
INET trading in NASDAQ stocks. Since our order data come from the INET trading platform, a natural concern is how much of market-wide trading occurs on INET. Nearly all of the trading in NASDAQ stocks during our sample period occurs on three venues: NASDAQ, INET (which is owned by NASDAQ but at this time operates as a separate market and reports trades separately from NASDAQ), and Arca (which has not yet merged with the NYSE). Table 2 shows that INET is the second-largest trading venue, representing about one quarter of total trading volume in our sample stocks in the month prior to our sample period ( seconds to find the matching trade. Over 98% of short sales are matched within one second, and 99.5% are matched within five seconds (see Appendix for the frequency distribution of matches).
In the remainder of the paper, we use matches based on the one-second window, for consistency with Asquith et al. (2010) . We also run a series of robustness checks including all trades for which matches occur within longer look-ahead/look-back windows. The results from these checks are nearly identical to the reported results and are available on request.
The INET data indicate whether each trade executes against a sitting buy or sell order in the limit order book.
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Following the chronology of order submission logic proposed by Odders-
White (2000), we designate trades that execute against a sitting buy order (a buy limit order) as seller-initiated and trades that execute against a sitting sell order (a sell limit order) as buyerinitiated. This procedure produces a dataset of short sales and long sales executed on the INET platform with the true trade initiator identified directly from the order data. 
Lee-Ready algorithm versus true trade initiator
We begin this section by examining the seller-initiation percentages for short and long sales at the daily aggregation level. This analysis is comparable to Asquith et al. (2010) . To augment this analysis, we then examine the misclassification frequencies at the trade level. The latter, more granular approach allows us to see whether the daily results reflect the true classification accuracy or are driven by trade misclassifications offsetting each other intraday. [ Table 3 Here]
Classification at the daily level
The differences between the True and LR-estimated seller-initiated percentages are statistically insignificant in all periods, for both short and long sales, in both the pilot and nonpilot samples. For example, the true proportion of seller-initiated short trades in pilot stocks during the combined period is 42.6%, and the Lee-Ready algorithm estimates this share as 42.8%
-a statistically insignificant difference. Similarly, the true share of seller-initiated long trades in pilot stocks is 54.7%, compared to the Lee-Ready estimated 54.8%. We find similar results when we compare the percentage of seller-initiated share volume instead of seller-initiated trades (see columns labeled %Shares in Table 3 ).
Our order-based analysis indicates that the preponderance of buyer initiation in short sales is true rather than the result of inaccuracies of the Lee-Ready algorithm as Asquith et al. (2010) suggest. Another notable observation from our findings is that short sellers are typically engaged in liquidity provision, as they initiate less than half of the trades they are involved in.
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Long sellers, on the other hand, more often initiate trades and therefore consume liquidity. The greater 9 Statistical tests (unreported, but available on request) of the differences between short-sale and long-sale sellerinitiation percentages show that the differences are significant at the 1% level.
aggressiveness of long sellers dovetails with recent evidence that long sales depress prices more than short sales (Bailey and Zheng, 2010; and Shkilko et al., 2010) and that short sellers often choose to provide liquidity to impatient buyers (Diether et al., 2009b; and Comerton-Forde et al., 2011) .
Our finding that the Lee-Ready algorithm classifies close to 43% of short volume in NASDAQ pilot stocks as seller-initiated is consistent with Asquith et al.'s (2010) finding of 42%
to 47% seller initiation in their sample of NASDAQ pilot stocks (their Table 3 , page 166). For non-pilot stocks, the Lee-Ready algorithm classifies 43% to 45% of short volume as sellerinitiated in our sample, whereas Asquith et al. report 37% to 39% in their sample. As mentioned earlier, we do not expect our estimates for non-pilot stocks to match those in Asquith et al.
because our sample is focused on INET trades, and INET did not strictly enforce the bid price test for non-pilot stocks during this period.
Tests of the differences between the pilot and non-pilot seller-initiated percentages show that the differences are statistically insignificant in both sample months and overall. In Table 4 , we compare the true initiator for each trade with the classification provided by the Lee-Ready algorithm. In this table, we use contemporaneous trades and quotes to make the results comparable to our analysis in Table 3 and to most of the current literature. We conduct a series of robustness checks using lags of quotes later in this section.
Nearly 32% of short sales are misclassified by the Lee-Ready algorithm in our sample:
14.8% of true seller-initiated short trades are misclassified as buyer-initiated by Lee-Ready, and 17% of true buyer-initiated short sales are misclassified as seller-initiated. Similarly, Lee-Ready misclassifies about 31% of long sales, with 15.3% of long seller-initiated trades misclassified as buys and 15.5% of long buyer-initiated trades misclassified as sells. These misclassification rates are about double those found by Finucane (2000) and Odders-White (2000) for NYSE transactions from the early 1990s. Odders-White reports that nearly 15% of trades were misclassified by Lee-Ready: 7.6% of true sells were classified as buys, and 7.4% of true buys were classified as sells (her Table 2 , Panel C, page 267).
[ Table 4 Here]
Our results may appear surprising to readers who expect that in a fully electronic market like INET, the Lee-Ready algorithm should be able to determine a trade's direction with near-perfect accuracy. Indeed, in a hypothetical purely electronic limit order market, in which (i) all orders are publicly displayed, (ii) the inside quotes always match the NBBO, (iii) time clocks at every NBBO contributor are perfectly synchronized, and (iv) new orders never arrive simultaneously, the Lee-Ready logic should lead to very precise estimates. Every incoming marketable order would execute against either the best bid or the best offer, and comparing the resulting transaction price to the prevailing inside quotes would perfectly identify trade direction.
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We note that INET differs from the ideal market assumptions in several ways. First, hidden orders are allowed, and one cannot see hidden orders in the INET data until and unless they are executed. Second, INET traders are not market makers and thus are not obligated to post twosided quotes at all times. 14 Given the imperfect performance of the Lee-Ready algorithm on the trade level, we examine whether the trade and firm characteristics that have been shown to affect misclassification rates are disproportionally affecting trade identification in our sample. The results in Table 5 suggest that misclassifications generally follow patterns that are similar to those found by Odders-White (2000) . Specifically, misclassifications are highest at the spread midpoint (Panel A), for stocks with more transactions (Panel C), and for larger firms (Panel D). The only notable difference is that our sample exhibits higher misclassification rates for large trades (Panel B), whereas
Odders-White finds higher misclassification rates for small trades. We verify our results using two trade-size cutoffs: 300 shares, which is approximately the mean trade size in our sample (and equal to the cutoff that Odders-White uses), and 100 shares, which is the median trade size in our sample. Both size cutoffs show higher misclassification rates for larger trades. Although this switch to higher misclassification of large rather than small trades is interesting, it cannot explain the overall increase in trade misclassification since the early 1990s, as the proportion of large trades has fallen over time.
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A new development since the 1990s is the introduction of hidden orders on ECNs such as INET. The misclassification frequencies for trades executed against hidden orders are between 30% and 32%, and misclassification frequencies for trades executed against displayed orders are between 31% and 32% (Panel E). We note that the difference in misclassification rates between displayed and hidden orders is not large enough to explain the increase in trade misclassification over time. It appears that the significant increase in misclassification frequency since the early 1990s is driven by an increase in misclassifications across the board, rather than a major shift towards the types of trades that are more often misclassified.
[ Table 5 Here]
A notable difference between our analysis and earlier studies of trade misclassification, such as Odders-White (2000), is that prior to 1998 most researchers using the Lee-Ready algorithm compare trades to quotes that are in effect a minimum of five seconds before the transaction is reported. In contrast, our Table 4 follows the current convention of a zero-second lag between quotes and trades. To facilitate comparison with the earlier studies, we next calculate misclassification frequencies using one-through five-second lags between quotes and trades.
16 15 More than half of the trades are over 300 shares in Odders-White's (2000) sample, versus less than a quarter of the trades in our sample. 16 Lee and Ready (1991) propose the five-second quote lag to account for quotes being updated before the trades that triggered them were reported, because at the time of their study quotes were updated on a computer while trades
The results in Table 6 suggest that introducing a quote lag reduces the incidence of misclassification. The total misclassification percentage drops to 21.4% for short sales using a one-second lag (Panel A), then rises monotonically to 23.6% for short sales using a five-second lag (Panel E). A similar pattern obtains for long sales. This analysis suggests that for trade-level classification, lagging quotes by at least one second is better than using contemporaneous quotes in the Lee-Ready algorithm.
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This result is consistent with the argument in Peterson and Sirri (2003), who note that using the NBBO quotes contemporaneous with the trade instead of the NBBO at order submission will cause the Lee-Ready algorithm to misclassify some trades, and that the degree of misclassification will depend on the time that the order takes to execute.
[ Table 6 Here]
Although lagging the quotes reduces the misclassification frequency at the trade level, Table   7 shows that it does not improve Lee-Ready's accuracy once the classifications are aggregated to the daily level, because most of the misclassified buys and misclassified sells offset each other.
In our sample, the daily averages are closest to the true values when no lag is used, but most of the Lee-Ready estimates based on one-to five-second quote lags produce daily seller-initiation percentages that are economically similar to the no-lag estimates and the true seller-initiation percentages.
[ Table 7 Here]
In summary, analysis of order data suggests that the Lee-Ready algorithm misclassifies more than 30% of trades at the trade level. Because misclassification rates are not biased towards buys were entered manually. Bessembinder (2003) finds that by 1998, making no allowance for trade reporting lags is preferred to a five-second lag. Vergote (2005) reports that a two-second delay is optimal, while Piwowar and Wei (2006) suggest that a one-second lag produces superior trade direction estimates. 17 Analyses of trade misclassification frequencies by characteristics reveal similar relations for the Lee-Ready algorithm using one-to five-second quote lags as for the Lee-Ready algorithm using contemporaneous quotes (as in Table 5 ). These results are available from the authors on request.
or sells, the misclassified trades cancel each other out at the daily aggregation level. Further, introducing a one-second lag in quotes reduces the trade-level misclassification to less than 22%, while lagging quotes does not result in economically significant changes in the accuracy of daily aggregates.
Consequences of trade misclassification in analyzing short and long seller aggressiveness
A natural question is whether trade misclassification at the daily or intraday level affects the inferences drawn from multivariate studies of trader behavior. In the regression models that follow, we use both the true aggressiveness from INET order data and the Lee-Ready estimates.
If the Lee-Ready estimates of trade initiation are adequate substitutes for the true trade initiation derived from order data, inference will be similar for models using the true aggressiveness and the Lee-Ready estimates.
The analysis in Section 3.1 indicates that short sellers are less aggressive than long sellers.
About 43% of daily short sales are seller-initiated, while about 55% of daily long sales are seller-
initiated. Yet short sellers are often vilified in the media. One possible explanation is that although they are less aggressive than long sellers in general, short sellers are particularly aggressive when their activities are most detrimental. To investigate this possibility, we move to a multivariate setting and examine when short sellers and long sellers are most aggressive.
One challenge for our analysis is that the literature lacks a theoretical model of short sellers' day-to-day behavior. In the absence of a theoretical foundation, recent empirical studies have relied on various sets of explanatory variables; however, there is little consensus on the set of covariates to include.
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The structure and focus of our study suggest that the model of Diether et 
Aggressiveness at the daily level
Equation (2) includes our variables of interest and control variables in a panel regression specification:
, , Reg SHO pilot stock, else zero; we include the pilot variable in case the multivariate framework reveals differences in seller aggressiveness that were not observable in our initial tests (Table 3) .
StockDummy k,i is an indicator variable equal to one if observation SI i,t is for stock k, else zero, to 19 We present the regression results using the seller-initiated percentage as the dependent variable for ease of economic interpretation. All results are robust to an alternative specification in which the dependent variable is defined as the log odds ratio of the seller-initiation percentage to address the limited nature of the dependent variable. Results of regressions using the log odds ratio are available from the authors on request. 20 We use this definition of volatility for consistency with Diether et al. (2009b) Table 8 ) and with return variables replaced by order imbalance variables (even-numbered specifications in Table 8 ). We are concerned about both serial correlation and cross-correlation, so we estimate standard errors that are clustered by both calendar day and stock (Thompson, 2011).
[ Table 8 Here]
Specification 1 in Table 8 shows that when returns are positive, short sellers are less aggressive, initiating a smaller percentage of trades, and when returns are negative, short sellers are more aggressive.
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In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficient on same-day return, Return i,t , implies that a one percentage point positive (negative) return results in a 1.45 percentage point drop (increase) in the short-seller aggressiveness. This is consistent with our hypothesis that when prices are rising, buyers are more aggressive, and thus sellers can act as passive liquidity providers, relying on limit orders and leading to a lower seller-initiation percentage. Conversely, when prices are falling, short sellers may rely less on limit orders if they seek speedy executions.
In most specifications, short sellers appear less aggressive when spreads are wider, consistent with the hypothesis that they act as opportunistic risk bearers, while the coefficient estimates on volatility are mostly insignificant. Specification 5 in Table 8 shows that like short sellers, long sellers are less aggressive when returns are positive. In contrast to short sellers, long sellers appear more aggressive when spreads are wider, but only when we use true trade initiation (specification 5 in Table 8 ).
We emphasize that although short sellers demand more liquidity in down markets, our results do not necessarily imply that short sellers deliberately push prices down. Notably, we obtain similar aggressiveness results for long sellers (specification 5). Although the coefficient estimates are smaller for long sales than for short sales, multivariate tests show that the differences between these coefficients are not statistically significant.
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Thus the data imply that there is no difference between short and long sellers' aggressiveness in up or down markets. In this light, the negative reputation of short sellers remains puzzling.
Specifications 2 and 6 in Table 8 show that replacing returns with positive order imbalances leads to similar inference. When a stock has a large positive order imbalance, short sellers and long sellers are less aggressive. The mechanical link between order imbalance and seller aggressiveness likely explains the higher explanatory power in the order-imbalance regressions (e.g., R-squared of 34.47% in specification 2 versus 13.46% in specification 1). 22 In these tests, we include short sellers and long sellers together in a multivariate model similar to that in equation (2). To test for significance of differences, we include a dummy variable that indicates observations corresponding to short sales as opposed to long sales. The interaction of this dummy with the return variable has an insignificant coefficient, suggesting that the difference between short and long sellers' aggressiveness is not statistically significant.
Using Lee-Ready estimates for seller initiation percentages leads to similar inferences as using true seller initiation percentages (see specifications 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4, or 5 and 6 versus 7 and 8). Both the True and the Lee-Ready measures imply that positive returns and positive order imbalances have a significantly negative effect on seller aggressiveness for both short and long sales; the main difference is that the coefficient estimates are larger when we use true seller initiation. This difference in the coefficients is statistically significant for both short and long sales. True initiation percentages also result in a better model fit. Using Lee-Ready estimates to determine trade direction appears to add noise but does not change the qualitative inference of our analyses.
Aggressiveness at the intraday level
Although the results in Table 8 are informative, we recognize that they may be affected by endogeneity. Of particular concern are the relations between trade aggressiveness, returns, and volatility, which may be changing in a systematic way and may not be successfully captured by the daily aggregates in equation (2).
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One way to alleviate potential endogeneity is to reestimate equation (2) on the intraday level, relying on short-term lags of the dependent variables.
To ensure that all sample stocks have a sufficient number of observations for intraday analysis, we divide each trading day into 30-minute intervals and use explanatory variables from the preceding interval to draw inferences.
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Correlations between returns and order imbalances and between order imbalances and dependent variables remain high on the intraday level (e.g., correlation between returns and order imbalances is 0.2, significant at 1% level), therefore we 23 For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005, 2009 ) theorize that aggressive selling that causes significant price changes may, under certain conditions, induce even more selling and further price changes, often accompanied by substantial volatility. 24 We exclude the first 30 minutes of each trading day to avoid using explanatory variables from the prior day. As a result we have twelve 30-minute intraday observations for each stock on each day.
follow the approach adopted in Table 8 and use returns in the odd-numbered specifications and order imbalances in the even-numbered specifications. In addition, we exclude the lagged dependent variable because of its correlation with other explanatory variables. Finally, we use two versions of the Lee-Ready estimates, with one-second and zero-second lags, to see whether lagging the quote improves Lee-Ready results at the half-hourly level of aggregation. Equation (3) includes our variables of interest and control variables in a panel regression specification:
, , ,
, , The results of the intraday analyses, reported in Table 9 , generally confirm our earlier findings. Aggressiveness of both short and long sellers declines when lagged intraday returns are positive and increases when lagged returns are negative.
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Additionally, positive order imbalances reduce aggressiveness of both seller types. Short sellers provide greater liquidity 25 The differences between return coefficients in the short sale and long sale specifications are statistically insignificant.
when spreads are wider, but this effect does not extend to long sellers. Finally, volatility remains a mostly insignificant factor for short and long sellers' aggressiveness.
[ Table 9 Here]
As in the daily analyses, analyses using the true and Lee-Ready dependent variables yield similar inference in terms of the signs of the coefficients, although coefficient values differ. The coefficients from one-second lag estimates are closer to the coefficients of the true estimates than the coefficients from zero-second lag estimates are, confirming our recommendation that researchers should consider using one-second lags when applying the Lee-Ready algorithm to intraday analyses. We caution that the distortions caused by zero-second lags may have larger impact in a more granular trade-by-trade analyses; it is possible that our 30-minute aggregation period is long enough to allow misclassifications on both sides to partly offset each other. In addition, we note that our results are obtained from the INET order data and may apply differently for markets with different structures.
Conclusions
This study examines the success rates of the Lee-Ready trade classification algorithm for short and long sales, using true trade initiation data from INET. We show that despite recent criticism, the algorithm performs well and correctly identifies most short sales as buyer-initiated and most long sales as seller-initiated. In daily aggregates, Lee-Ready misclassification rates are near zero. This result validates a number of recent day-level studies that use the algorithm to sign trades.
Despite the success of the algorithm at the daily level, we find that it performs less than ideally at the more granular trade level, misclassifying more than 30% of trades. Because misclassification is evenly split between buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades, the errors offset each other in daily aggregates. The increase in misclassification in our more recent sample is substantial, compared to the 15% misclassification rate reported in samples from the early 1990s. We further show that determinants of misclassification identified in prior research still
matter, yet none of them has changed enough to explain the increase in misclassification rates over time.
In our main results, we follow the current convention of using contemporaneous quotes and trades to determine trade direction. When we instead use a one-second quote lag, the misclassification rate declines by one third, to about 21%. Our results suggest that researchers who use the Lee-Ready algorithm at the trade level in recent samples may benefit from lagging quotes.
Finally, we show that using Lee-Ready estimates leads to similar inferences as using true trade initiation data in a study of short and long sellers' behavior. We show that both long sellers and short sellers provide liquidity in up markets and demand liquidity in down markets.
Moreover, short sellers' order aggressiveness is statistically indistinguishable from long sellers' aggressiveness. Our findings are particularly notable in light of media and regulators' attention to short sellers' allegedly aggressive trading practices and suggest that the widespread suspicion of short sellers may not be warranted.
Our results are important on three levels. First, we confirm that using the Lee-Ready algorithm to sign trades results in estimates that are nearly indistinguishable from true initiation rates at the daily level, removing the cloud of suspicion about the algorithm's reliability in daylevel studies. Second, we caution that using the Lee-Ready algorithm in intraday studies without lagging quotes may result in misclassification rates that are considerably higher than those obtained in the 1990s. To reduce misclassification in intraday studies, we suggest lagging quotes by one second. Finally, we shed new light on short and long sellers' aggressiveness while showing that both true trade initiation and Lee-Ready estimates of trade initiation lead to similar inference in this setting. . % Shares shorted is the ratio of the number of shares shorted to total volume. Quoted spread is the difference between the best ask and best bid quotes; Effective spread is twice the difference of the trade price minus the quote midpoint at the time of the trade, times an indicator equal to +1 (-1) for buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trades, with trade initiator determined from order data. Percentage spreads are calculated as the effective or quoted spread in cents divided by the quote midpoint. Averages are calculated for each stock across all sample days, and crosssectional means and medians of the time-series averages are reported in this table. P-values are based on t -tests for mean differences and Wilcoxon signed rank tests for median differences. Data are from CRSP, TAQ, and the INET order book. is defined analogously based on the average order imbalance over the prior five days. Spread t is the percentage effective spread for the stock on day t . Volatility t is the difference between the stock's high and low price on day t , divided by the high price; Volatility t-5,t-1 is the average volatility over the previous five days. Turnover t-5,t-1 is the log of the average daily share turnover of the stock over the previous five days. is the average of the dependent variable over the previous five days. Pilot is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is a Reg SHO pilot stock, else zero. Reported values of the Turnover and Pilot coefficient estimates are scaled by 100 for ease of reading. Regressions also include stock fixed effects and day fixed effects. Sample comprises 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks and 100 non-pilot stocks matched on price, market capitalization, and volume; analysis period is June and December 2005. T-statistics, reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, are robust to time-series and cross-sectional correlation. R 2 demeaned is the reported R-squared from a regression that demeans the data to implement the fixed effects, and R 2 is the reported R-squared from a regression that explicitly includes the dummy variables to implement the fixed effects. t-1 is equal to the buy-sell order imbalance (as a % of interval volume) of the stock in the previous interval if the imbalance is greater than 0, else zero. Spread t-1 is the percentage effective spread for the stock in the previous interval. Volatility t-1 is the difference between the stock's high and low price in the previous interval, divided by the high price. Turnover t-1 is the log of the interval share turnover of the stock over the previous interval. Pilot is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is a Reg SHO pilot stock, else zero. Reported values of the Turnover and Pilot coefficient estimates are scaled by 100 for ease of reading. Regressions also include stock fixed effects, day fixed effects, and interval fixed effects. Sample comprises 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks and 100 non-pilot stocks matched on price, market capitalization, and volume; analysis period is June and December 2005. Tstatistics, reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, are robust to time-series and cross-sectional correlation. R 2 demeaned is the reported R-squared from a regression that demeans the data to implement the fixed effects, and R 2 is the reported R-squared from a regression that explicitly includes the dummy variables to implement the fixed effects. 
L-R Estimated

